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Superspreading events were pivotal in the global
spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). We
investigated superspreading in one transmission chain
early in Beijing’s epidemic. Superspreading was defined as
transmission of SARS to at least eight contacts. An index
patient with onset of SARS 2 months after hospital admis-
sion was the source of four generations of transmission to
76 case-patients, including 12 healthcare workers and sev-
eral hospital visitors. Four (5%) case circumstances met
the superspreading definition. Superspreading appeared to
be associated with older age (mean 56 vs. 44 years), case
fatality (75% vs. 16%, p = 0.02, Fisher exact test), number
of close contacts (36 vs. 0.37) and attack rate among close
contacts (43% vs. 18.5%, p < 0.025). Delayed recognition
of SARS in a hospitalized patient permitted transmission to
patients, visitors, and healthcare workers. Older age and
number of contacts merit investigation in future studies of
superspreading. 
O
ne of the most intriguing aspects of coronavirus-
associated severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
has been the circumstances under which virus is transmit-
ted to large numbers of persons. One so-called super-
spreading event occurred in a Hong Kong hotel, when
transmission from an ill traveler from Guangdong led to
export of the virus to several other countries (1). Another
highly effective episode of viral transmission occurred
onboard China Air’s flight 112 from Hong Kong to Beijing
on March 15, 2003 (2). Superspreading also played major
roles in transmission of SARS within Singapore (3) and
Toronto (4). The potential to transmit SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) to large numbers of contacts is
likely influenced by factors associated with the host, agent,
and environment. To develop hypotheses for future inter-
national evaluation of this issue, reviewing the circum-
stances of transmission associated with individual super-
spreading events may be useful. 
Beijing experienced the largest outbreak of SARS, with
>2,500 cases reported between March and June 2003 (2).
Several instances of superspreading were recognized dur-
ing the Beijing epidemic, including two associated with
imported cases, from Guangdong and Hong Kong, that
each proved critical to the rapid increase in cases (2).
Epidemiologic investigation of another chain of transmis-
sion that occurred early in Beijing’s outbreak permitted
identification of several persons who spread SARS-CoV to
many others. We describe this chain of transmission and
the characteristics of superspreading detected in the course
of its investigation.
Methods
Reporting
Potential cases of infectious atypical pneumonia, later
called SARS, were reported by hospitals to the Beijing
Center for Disease Control, which initiated epidemiologic
investigations. Data sources included case report forms,
epidemiologic investigation forms, and other investigation
records at Beijing’s Center for Disease Control. 
Definitions
Cases were defined, in accordance with the “National
Case Definition of Infectious Atypical Pneumonia (SARS)
in China, 2003,” which was updated by the China Ministry
of Health on April 23, 2003. Criteria for probable and sus-
pected SARS included travel to a SARS-epidemic area in
the 2 weeks before onset of symptoms or close contact
with a probable SARS patient; fever of >38°C; chest x-ray
abnormalities; normal or decreased leukocyte count; and
no response to treatment with antimicrobial drugs. 
Close contacts were identified according to the
“Regulation of Beijing SARS close contact isolation, quar-
antine, service and supply.” The definition involved per-
sons who shared meals, utensils, place of residence, a
hospital room, or a transportation vehicle with a known
probable or suspected SARS patient or had visited a SARS
patient in a period beginning14 days before the patient’s
onset of symptoms. Healthcare workers who examined or
treated a SARS patient or any person who had potential
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contacts. We arbitrarily defined superspreading to occur
when one SARS patient was attributed as the source of
SARS in >8 other persons.
Epidemiologic Investigation
We investigated probable and suspected cases reported
from hospitals in Beijing to understand their relationship to
each other, determine the incubation period between expo-
sure and symptom onset, and describe clinical features at
the time of symptom onset. We identified and followed
close contacts of SARS patients to monitor their progress.
We sought clinical data for patients associated with super-
spreading. The chi-square statistic and where appropriate,
Fisher exact test, were used to compare proportions.
Results
Initial Infection and Transmission 
A62-year-old woman (patient A) was admitted to a spe-
cialty hospital in Beijing for treatment of diabetes mellitus
on February 5, 2003. The hospital treated a SARS patient in
late March 2003, but specific contacts between that patient
and patient A have not been identified. On April 5, 2003,
fever and headache developed in patient A. Her leukocyte
count was 6.4 x109/L, and chest x-ray showed bilateral
infiltrates with pleural effusion. She was treated for possi-
ble tuberculosis. Her clinical condition deteriorated, and
she died April 12. On the same day, fever and chest x-ray
abnormalities developed in eight of her relatives, including
her husband, sons, daughters, and son-in-law, and they
were diagnosed as having probable SARS (Figure 1). 
Patient Ahad 74 close contacts, including 25 healthcare
workers, 11 relatives, 36 patients who were hospitalized in
the same ward, and 2 persons who were accompanying
other patients on the same ward. Among the close contacts,
SARS developed in 33 of 74, for a secondary infection rate
of 45% (Figure 2). 
Infection and Transmission among 
Second-Generation Patients
The 33 second-generation patients had 98 close con-
tacts; SARS developed in 31 (32%). Nine (27%) of the 33
second-generation patients transmitted SARS to one or
more contact. 
Patients B and C were in the same ward as patient Aand
were discharged from the hospital after patient Awas diag-
nosed with SARS. Each of them transmitted SARS to two
relatives after discharge. The secondary infection rate
among their contacts was 50% (4/8).
Patients D, E, F, G, and H were also hospitalized in the
same ward as patient A, for the treatment of other diseases.
They remained in the hospital after patient A was diag-
nosed with SARS. They later caused infection among vis-
itors and some persons who accompanied them during
their hospital stay. This hospital had not implemented iso-
lation and quarantine procedures for SARS during this
period.
Patient D (associated with superspreading) is a 70-
year-old woman whose symptoms developed on April 13.
She had five close contacts among her relatives; SARS did
not occur in any of them. On April 12, patient Lwas admit-
ted to the hospital for head trauma and placed in the same
room as patient D. Patient L had 15 relatives who made
frequent visits to the room; SARS developed in 10 of
these, presumably from contact with patient D in the
shared room. Among patient L’s family visitors to the
room, the attack rate was 66.7% (10/15). Among all the
visitors to the room (for patients D and L), the attack rate
was 50% (10/20).
Patient H (associated with superspreading) is a 69-year-
old woman whose symptoms developed on April 11,
including chest x-ray with bilateral infiltrates. SARS
developed in 8 of her 11 close contacts (secondary infec-
tion rate 73%). The second-generation patients E, F, and G
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve of probable cases of severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome, by date of onset of illness in one chain of trans-
mission, Beijing 2003.
Figure 2. Probable cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome by
source of transmission in chain of 77 cases in Beijing, 2003.each had one close contact; SARS developed in all three
contacts. 
Three additional persons (patients J, K, and Q) had
been accompanying patients on the ward; symptoms of
SARS developed in these three persons in the period April
12–18. Two of these (patients J and K) transmitted SARS
to three contacts each. The other 22 second-generation
patients had 32 close contacts; none developed SARS.
Infection and Transmission among 
Third-Generation Patients
The 31 third-generation patients had 54 close contacts.
Patient I was the only one who transmitted to others.
Patient I, a 23-year-old man who had close contact with
patient G, had onset of symptoms on April 25; unilateral
abnormalities became visible on chest x-ray during the
course of his illness. He had 45 close contacts with whom
he either worked or lived; SARS occurred in 12 of these.
The secondary attack rate among contacts of patient I was
27%.
Outcomes of Illness among Patients 
in Infection Chain
A total of 77 SARS patients were in this chain of trans-
mission, including 15 who died (including index case-
patient A), for a case-fatality ratio of 20%. Case fatality
was similar between the second and third generations
(7/31, or 23%, second-generation patients, vs. 6/33, or
18%, third-generation patients). All deaths occurred
among persons >40 years of age. Case-patients who died
averaged 63 years of age (range 41 to 82); surviving
patients averaged 40 years (range 17 to 80) (p < 0.001). 
Analysis of Epidemiology of Superspreading 
Among the 77 patients, 66 did not transmit to others,
and 7 transmitted to <3 contacts. In contrast, four persons
(patients A, D, H, and I) transmitted to >8 others and were
designated as associated with superspreading. The pattern
of transmission is shown in Figure 3.
We compared the four case-patients associated with
superspreading to the 73 other patients whose circumstances
were associated with less frequent or no transmission.
Patients linked to superspreading tended to be older than
others in this transmission chain (mean 56 vs. 44.2 years)
and a higher proportion were women (3/4 vs. 30/73, 41%,
not significant by Fisher exact test). Three (75%) of four
superspreaders died from their infection, compared with
12 (16%) of 73 others (p = 0.02, Fisher exact test, two
tailed). Overall, healthcare workers accounted for 12
(16%) of the cases in this transmission chain, similar to the
proportion of healthcare workers in the Beijing epidemic
as a whole (16%) (2). None of the superspreading events
involved transmission from healthcare workers.  
We attempted a comparison of the number of close con-
tacts of the index patient in superspreading events with the
number of close contacts of other SARS patients; we also
compared the proportion of close contacts in whom SARS
developed for these two groups. Case-patients associated
with superspreading averaged 36 contacts (range 11–74)
while others averaged only 0.37 contacts. SARS developed
in an average of 43% of close contacts of the four case-
patients associated with superspreading; the syndrome
developed in 18.5% of close contacts of the other patients.
Thus superspreading appeared to be associated with a
greater number of contacts and SARS developed in a high-
er proportion of those contacts (p < 0.025). These compar-
isons do not incorporate the susceptibility of contacts, but
it is likely that the contacts of patient A represented a vul-
nerable population, since 36 (49%) of her 74 contacts were
other hospitalized patients, while contacts of the later gen-
eration patients were primarily persons accompanying or
visiting patients. Of note, five patients (B, C, E, F, G) who
transmitted SARS to only 1–2 close contacts each had
relatively few close contacts (range 1–4), which suggests
limited opportunities for transmission instead of intrinsic
differences in the transmissibility of their illness.
The epidemic curve for cases in this chain of transmis-
sion is shown in Figure 1. The three peaks of cases corre-
spond to 1) second-generation patients, exposed to the
index patient A (peak April 12–14), with a mean incuba-
tion period of 5.7 days; 2) third-generation patients (peak
April 22–26); and 3) fourth-generation patients, peak May
4, all of whom had contact with patient I. 
Cases clearly clustered in the hospital and within
household members. The 77 cases involved 8 households
and 1 construction site. There were 47 cases that represent-
ed secondary infection within households or workplaces,
accounting for 61.3% of all patients. Seven of the eight
families (77.8%) had more than two members with SARS.
Sixty-two patients (81%) were either in the hospital before
the onset of SARS or accompanied patients hospitalized on
the same ward. Thus, even though there was transmission
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Figure 3. Number of direct secondary cases from probable cases
of severe acute respiratory syndrome in one chain of transmission
in Beijing, 2003. within most families, the place that family members were
exposed in most of these cases was the hospital. Three of
four superspreading events in this transmission chain
occurred within the hospital; transmission from patient I
was associated with a crowded construction site. 
Discussion 
Our investigation highlights several features of SARS
transmission observed in multiple outbreaks, including
the central role of hospitals in disease transmission, the
difficulty in distinguishing SARS from other clinical
symptoms, and the danger associated with delayed case
detection and isolation. Our investigation suggests that
superspreading was related to both the environment (e.g.,
hospitals where large numbers of contacts occur) and host
(patients who were older and had more severe illness).
This transmission chain occurred relatively early in
Beijing’s outbreak, and hospital authorities had not yet
introduced personal protective equipment or isolation of
patients with respiratory conditions. 
The index patient in this report had been hospitalized for
2 months before clinical symptoms of SARS began. Early
detection of SARS cannot simply focus on emergency
room or outpatient encounters, since nosocomial infection
may be the first indication of a cluster of illness. The
patient’s condition was originally diagnosed as tuberculo-
sis, another syndrome notable for potential for nosocomial
transmission. Had they been implemented, appropriate res-
piratory precautions and patient isolation for suspected TB
might have reduced hospital transmission of SARS.
Improved infection-control standards for other conditions
may benefit SARS control, and vice versa.
Transmission in three of the four superspreading events
we describe occurred in the hospital setting. The hospital
environment provided an efficient site for transmission, as
was the case in other SARS outbreaks. Before administra-
tive controls were introduced, our hospitalized patients had
large numbers of contacts, including other patients, family
members accompanying them during hospitalization, and
other visitors. Other hospitalized patients are likely to be
highly susceptible hosts because of older age and coexist-
ing conditions. The viral load of hospitalized SARS
patients is another potential factor; efficiency of SARS
transmission increases in the 2nd week of illness, presum-
ably as a function of viral load (5) or increasingly severe
respiratory symptoms. The occurrence of SARS in many
visitors to hospitals in Beijing and elsewhere highlights the
need for administrative controls to restrict exposures to
potentially infectious patients. Although not identified as
factors in this transmission chain, certain aerosol-produc-
ing procedures, such as nebulizer treatments and emer-
gency intubations, appeared to increase the risk for SARS
transmission in other reports (6,7,2). 
Superspreading appeared to be associated with patients
who had larger numbers of close contacts as well as a high-
er attack rate among those contacts. These findings may be
limited by bias introduced in assigning all patients hospi-
talized on the same ward to be contacts of the index
patient. Although all case-patients were interviewed about
close contacts, recall bias may have caused case-patients
who were known to have transmitted to close contacts to
be more thorough in identifying additional contacts. If we
exclude patient A, the index patient, the average number of
contacts for the three subsequent superspreading events
was 24, with an attack rate among those contacts of 42%,
still much higher than the corresponding numbers for other
cases in this transmission chain (average 0.37 contacts and
18.5% attack rate). Although administrative controls insti-
tuted relatively late in this transmission chain reduced the
number of contacts for some SARS patients, we cannot
exclude the possibility that ascertainment of contacts for
patients who did not transmit SARS was incomplete. In
our investigation, the only example of superspreading out-
side the hospital setting occurred at a construction site;
patient I had large numbers of contacts who worked and
lived in crowded circumstances.
Superspreading was not associated with transmission
from healthcare workers. Whether healthcare workers iso-
lated themselves more promptly or had less opportunity for
close contact is not known. Frequent handwashing by
healthcare personnel might have contributed to lower rates
of transmission. Because this outbreak occurred before
personal protective equipment was routinely used, it is
unlikely that use of masks or other such equipment was
responsible for the low rate of transmission from health-
care workers to their contacts. 
Our investigation raises hypotheses to be pursued in
larger scale analysis of superspreading, such as whether
demographic factors including female sex and older age
are consistently associated with higher risk of transmitting
to large numbers of others. Symptoms and signs evident
upon illness onset should also be determined to identify
clinical predictors of superspreading that might be inte-
grated into triage protocols in the future. Additional fea-
tures of the pathogen may also contribute to whether
excessive transmission occurs, such as viral strain charac-
teristics, viral load, or the presence of coinfecting organ-
isms. Because most of the superspreaders we identified
died from infection, the ability to gather additional infor-
mation by retrospective interviews was limited. Future
investigations will benefit from systematic and compre-
hensive prospective data collection from episodes of
superspreading as well as comparison case circumstances.
SARS is not the only respiratory infection character-
ized by superspreading (8–10); other respiratory pathogens
are often transmitted to large numbers of contacts.
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monia) attributable to SARS may make it easier to identi-
fy transmission chains and trace back to the index case in
a given community. In contrast to influenza and outbreaks
of most other respiratory infections, investigation of SARS
outbreaks could usually uncover an index case. The impact
that superspreading played on epidemics of SARS in indi-
vidual outbreaks, as well as in transporting the virus
between cities, underscores the need to recognize circum-
stances that facilitate widespread transmission so that con-
trol measures can be targeted appropriately. Thus, while
superspreading is not unique to SARS, its occurrence in
outbreaks may provide a guide to establishing critical
points for disease control.
The global epidemiology of SARS in 2003 was greatly
influenced by the occurrence of superspreading. Although
numerous countries observed imported cases of SARS, few
experienced local transmission. While some of the differ-
ence between the epidemiology of SARS after importation
into different countries may be the result of preparedness
and prompt patient isolation, the absence of a superspread-
ing event was likely the dominant factor influencing which
countries were spared epidemic spread. Pooling of infor-
mation about superspreading may help shed additional
light on the special set of circumstances required to dis-
seminate infection to large numbers of contacts.
Before better predictors of superspreading are
identified, triage procedures will require aggressive infec-
tion-control management of all possible SARS patients.
After prompt measures were introduced in Beijing in
response to the outbreak, opportunities for superspreading
were greatly reduced. Thus there may have been many
other patients with host or viral characteristics conducive
to superspreading later in the Beijing outbreak, but suc-
cessful infection control prevented these occurrences. As
this transmission chain probably represents the natural his-
tory of SARS transmission before interventions were
introduced, we can use these data to estimate the probabil-
ity of superspreading in a given set of patients. Four (5%)
of the 77 patients characterized in this transmission chain
spread to >8 others. Thus, our data suggest that in the
absence of interventions, superspreading is not a common
event. However, the global experience with SARS in 2003
demonstrated that a single superspreading event can initi-
ate a cascade of events that is difficult to interrupt.
Improvement of laboratory assays to recognize SARS-
CoV early in the clinical course may simplify infection-
control strategies for patients with suspected SARS.
However at present, clinical and epidemiologic character-
istics are the only factors that are initially readily available
to caregivers, and these must be scrutinized carefully to
assure appropriate isolation procedures.
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